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The Use of Incentives and the Promotion of Healthy Behaviours 
EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION 
In this text, Xavier Landes examines some ethical issues raised by the use of financial 
incentives to promote healthy eating habits. This essay is one in a series of essays written 
for the National Collaborating Centre for Healthy Public Policy by researchers associated 
with the Centre de recherche en éthique at the Université de Montréal. The essays present 
summary discussions of some contemporary ethical issues concerning various aspects of 
public policy and their impact on health. The goal is to encourage reflection on these issues 
among public health actors. 
Economic incentives are frequently employed as a means to implement public policy. For 
example, public authorities offer tax credits to encourage businesses to create jobs or to 
encourage individuals to use public transportation services, and many municipalities offer 
“tax holidays” to first-time home buyers. This text examines some of the ethical issues 
associated with using incentives to promote healthy eating habits. 
The text follows a two-part structure. In the first part, the author presents the two main types 
of justification (individual well-being and social welfare) that are typically invoked to defend 
the promotion of healthy living habits, and then analyzes the implications of each. He then 
responds to some of the ethical objections sometimes raised with respect to the use of 
economic incentives. In the second part, the author identifies four types of incentives, based 
on their nature (negative or positive) and their target (supply or demand), and assesses the 
related ethical issues. 
 
Your comments: 
This text makes an original contribution in several respects. For instance, it is rather rare to 
come across a discussion that applies analytic concepts from economics to the ethical issues 
surrounding the use of incentives to promote healthy eating habits. 
Accordingly, do you find this discussion convincing and appropriate? Does it allow the reader 
to weigh the ethical advantages and disadvantages of the public policy actions they favour? 
It should be noted that the author’s mandate was not to present an exhaustive analysis. 
Thus, while he looks closely at ethical issues related to social justice and utilitarianism, he 
only briefly considers or leaves aside other issues such as social labelling and discrimination, 
as well as, more generally, ethical issues related to moralizing over lifestyles in contemporary 
societies.  
Do you think that the latter avenues of ethical reflection should be explored? If so, in what 
way?
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INTRODUCTION 
One issue that has unquestionably raised concern among the public, governments, 
institutions and international organizations is obesity, and, in particular but not solely, 
childhood obesity. (World Health Organization [WHO], 2003, 2005; Delisle, 2004; Dériot, 
2005).1 The reasons for this concern are numerous, including the fact that excess weight 
produces social consequences (The Canadian Medical Association [CMA], 2007, p. 6; 
Katzmarzyk & Janssen, 2004; National Institute of Health and Medical Research [INSERM], 
2005, pp. 49-54)2 related to economic efficiency (Suhrcke, McKee, Sauto Arce, Tsolova & 
Mortensen, 2006, cited by AMC, 2007, pp. 5-6; Cusset 2008), health care (for France : 
Detournay et al., 2000), infrastructure development, etc. While the importance of this issue 
should not be diminished, there has nevertheless been a sort of catastrophic sensationalism 
in which obesity is referred to as an epidemic (for an example of this way of presenting the 
situation, see Faeh, 2006; Alderman, Smith, Fried & Daynard, 2007). Since the problem has 
resulted from unhealthy eating habits and a modern sedentary lifestyle, it most certainly does 
not have the characteristics of an epidemic (Epstein, 2005, p. 1367; Botterill, 2006, p. 4). It is 
thus preferable to view unhealthy eating and its consequences as a problem of collective 
action in the sense given by Olson (1971), with negative impacts for society as a whole 
(Marshall, 2000, p. 301; Botterrill, 2006, p. 7) rather than as an epidemiological issue. 
In any case, reducing the impact of unhealthy eating – that is, of eating foods rich in 
saturated fat, salt or sugar – and having people adopt healthy habits (consumption of fruits 
and vegetables, physical exercise) are legitimate public policy goals. Given this context, the 
use of incentives is one of the options available for modifying behaviour, as long as a flexible 
approach is applied (Jacobson & Brownell, 2000; Marshall, 2000; Caraher & Cowburn, 2005; 
Mytton, Gray, Rayner & Rutter, 2007; Godfrey & Maynard, 1988).3 
It is necessary to ask two questions. Firstly, what is the moral justification for promoting 
healthy behaviour? Secondly, what is the moral justification for implementing incentives? 
These questions will allow us to examine the legitimacy of preventive public policies. We will 
then review the various types of available incentives, the forms they take, and the secondary 
moral justifications underpinning them (with examples) and draw out the moral implications of 
each option. The goal here is to present the main normative reasons for using incentives. 
                                            
1 This issue took on global dimensions following the publication of a report by the World Health 
Organization/Food and Agricultural Organization. See also Deglise, although local concerns are much older. 
For Europe, see WHO (2005) or the report presented in 2005 by the French senator Dériot, Office 
parlementaire d’évaluation des politiques de santé. 
2 In Canada these costs have been assessed at $9.6 billion per year. The CMA cites the assessment performed 
by Katzmarzyk and Janssen. For France, see INSERM. 
3 In fact, the idea of taxing food seems to have been prompted by experiences related to tobacco consumption 
(Godfrey & Maynard). 
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1 WHY PROMOTE HEALTHY BEHAVIOUR? 
Many justifications have been given for promoting healthy behaviour. Overall, they fall 
between two poles – individual well-being and social efficiency (Associated Press, 2005).4 
According to the rationales of the first order, attempts to influence the behaviour of 
individuals are made in the interests of their own well-being. The premise of this argument is 
that individuals are seen to have difficulty defining or pursuing a range of behaviours that are 
good for them (Plato, 1997, 2002; Aristotle, 2004, book VII).5 That being the case, if one of 
the State’s functions is to improve the lives of individuals and not simply to provide them with 
the means for pursuing the lives they choose, then institutions’ interventions in the lives of 
individuals may be legitimate under certain conditions. This argument rests on the premise 
that the State is able to determine precisely what constitutes healthy behaviour. 
There are two possible objections to this line of reasoning. The first questions whether it is 
possible to determine precisely what would be good for an individual (s). This highlights the 
disjunction between individual and collective concerns. Whether a behaviour is healthy 
overall for a given category of the population is determined by statistical generalization; this 
does not always imply that it is good for a given individual or that any benefit the latter may 
derive from the behaviour will compensate for what is imposed on that individual in terms of 
cost or infringements on choice (Hayek, 2007).6 The second objection points to the strong 
risk of a violation of what the liberal philosopher Ronald Dworkin refers to as the 
“endorsement constraint.” (Dworkin, 1989, pp. 485-486). The endorsement constraint states 
that a life choice is good to the extent that the individual making it considers it so. Offering 
individuals incentives means trying to influence their free will or change the terms of their 
decision-making process so as to prompt them to adopt behaviour that, from an external 
point of view, is considered to be healthier. In public health, trying to convince people to 
abandon certain behaviours (smoking, consuming fatty foods) raises moral problems 
because it is entirely conceivable that autonomous and rational individuals believe that part 
of what makes life worth living is derived from pleasures that are, to a greater or lesser 
degree, harmful to their health. Urging them to change their lifestyles thus constitutes a 
violation of the endorsement constraint. 
On the other hand, when dealing with categories of the population characterized by a 
significantly impaired ability to make free and informed decisions (Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, Social 
                                            
4 This discussion ignores the taxing of fast food motivated by reasons external to public health, as was tried in 
the city of Detroit. In fact, when taxes are levied to balance the budget of a territorial collectivity, we cannot 
rightfully speak of incentives (Associated Press).  
5 The first failing – an inability to discern what is good for oneself – justifies, for Plato, the dominion of 
philosophers over the city. The second failing calls up the notions of weakness of will and akrasia. It should be 
noted that these are the two main justifications for paternalism (Plato, Aristotle). 
6 A variation of this objection points to the constructivist drive of the State, noting its tendency to bend reality to 
its vision of the good. This is a common critique made by libertarian authors.  
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Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 2005, sections 2.1 and 2.8)7, there 
are two justifications for such interventions. The first is that, due to their lack of autonomy, 
these persons’ choices do not carry the same moral weight as those of fully autonomous 
individuals. The second derives from the need to protect society’s most vulnerable members, 
in this case those with a limited capacity to perceive their long-term interests. This explains, 
for example, why measures that are more radical (advertising bans) or intrusive (such as 
dietary education) are contemplated for children. In such cases, the lower the average 
degree of individual autonomy presumed to exist within a given sub-population, the less the 
solutions chosen resemble a form of incentive.  
Given this context, charges of paternalism with respect to the use of incentives must be 
addressed and placed in perspective. Through incentives, healthy behaviours are still 
promoted, but indirectly. In the case of taxes, the goal is not to change individual behaviour 
at all costs. On the contrary, the principle consists in modifying the prices of products 
considered harmful, while leaving it to those concerned to either change or continue their 
behaviours. 
According to rationales of the second order, individuals should modify their behaviour, not 
because the changed behaviour would be better for them, but because it would be preferable 
from a collective point of view. This type of argument is based on the process of summing up 
the costs to society of certain practices or situations. What is sought is a situation that is 
socially efficient: that is, a situation in which costs are minimized. It cannot be denied that a 
number of behaviours entail certain costs, not only to those who adopt them, but also to 
others, meaning in this case to society as a whole. For example, when second-hand smoke 
is released, the treatment of the illnesses that arise is shouldered by the community, etc. 
While the first type of justification focuses on individual costs, the second type focuses on 
collective concerns. What is sought is no longer the improvement of individual well-being, as 
such, but rather a situation that can prove less costly to society. This being the case, public 
health policies based on this type of argument are more or less immune to criticism, since 
institutions are no longer acting solely for the sake of the individual and the individual’s health 
but rather taking into consideration the individual’s impact on others (Mill, 1990, p. 146).8 
Conversely, focusing on individual benefits renders a given policy very vulnerable to anti-
paternalist objections. The example of tobacco consumption illustrates this nuance. In the 
first case, the goal is to put an end to tobacco consumption, because this would be better for 
the individuals concerned. They would be less likely to die from lung cancer or 
cardiovascular problems. But individuals could very well argue in favour of their freedom to 
inflict damage upon themselves. In the second case, the goal is to reduce the costs of 
                                            
7 The concept of free and informed consent is referred to in the Tri-Council Policy Statement inspired by the 
Nuremberg Code. According to the definition given in the Statement, consent (that is, autonomy) is valid when 
a person is capable of giving their consent, is adequately informed about the nature and the foreseeable 
consequences of the acts engaged in, and has experienced no external constraint or coercion.  
8 “The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people. But 
if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according to his own inclination 
and judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons which show that opinion should be free, 
prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost.” 
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tobacco consumption to society as a whole. Now the freedom to smoke is being weighed 
against its consequences for others. The strength of the objection that demands respect for 
individual freedom is thus diminished. 
2 TYPES OF INCENTIVES 
There are four types of incentives, classified according to their nature (positive or negative) 
and their target (demand or supply). The first distinction refers as much to the method used 
as to the result sought; negative incentives are aimed at discouraging agents from engaging 
in certain activities, while positive incentives are used to promote specific practices. The 
second distinction refers to the public targeted: consumers or producers. 
2.1 NEGATIVE INCENTIVES APPLIED TO DEMAND 
In general, taxes are imposed in order to change individual behaviours. The premise derives 
from classical market theory: the higher the price of a good, the weaker the demand for it. 
When the question of incentives is raised, taxing food comes immediately to mind (Jacobson 
& Brownell, 2000, p. 854; Jensen & Smed, 2007).9 
The major advantage of negative incentives applied to demand is that they address the lack 
of a connection between risk at the population level and individual behaviour, which is the 
main shortcoming of other measures (information campaigns, education, etc.). Repeatedly, 
individuals fail to see the interest in adopting less pathogenic behaviour as long as they 
consider their personal gain they will personally derive from this to be minimal (Macho-
Stadler & Pérez-Castrillo, 2001, pp. 9-11).10 While the wide-scale adoption of healthy 
behaviours has a population-level impact, its impact at the individual level has the 
disadvantage of remaining largely unperceived. By taxing “unhealthy eating,” the legislator 
introduces a direct individual benefit associated with adopting behaviour that is healthier at a 
societal level. It also adds a source of motivation for change, apart from the simple 
awareness of health benefits: economic gain or loss. A secondary advantage is that the 
resources thus collected can be used to finance other public programs at the national or local 
levels. Thus, the two poles of justification are represented: individual well-being and social 
efficiency. 
Certain objections are nevertheless conceivable. Firstly, moral responsibility for the actions 
being discouraged (consumption of fatty, sugary or salty foods) and their negative 
consequences (obesity, cardiovascular problems, cancers) rests solely on the shoulders of 
the consumer. There is the risk of ostracizing the populations at risk, and the responsibility of 
                                            
9 There are two ways of taxing food: based on its content (fat tax) or on its inclusion in categories according to 
reduced nutritional value (junk food tax). Although the first method more efficiently promotes healthy behaviour, 
legislators, for reasons of convenience, generally prefer the second option (Jacobson & Brownell). The criterion 
applied when taxing junk food is, however, too general. No distinction is made between “good” and “bad” foods 
within a category. Thus, it would be more consistent and fair to impose surcharges based on a product’s 
composition. Moreover, the positive effects in terms of improved dietary habits seem greater (Jensen & Smed). 
10 This bias can be accentuated if individuals are insured against the risk in question. In fact, economists refer to 
this situation as a moral hazard. 
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industry is somewhat eclipsed. The extreme nature of this position explains why, in practice, 
taxation of food is often accompanied by complementary measures (education or information 
programs, taxation of the agri-food industry, funding of healthy products to render them more 
attractive, etc.) that lessen the individual burden (Jacobson & Brownell, 2000, p. 854).11 
Secondly, the issue of the degree of autonomy permitted is also present in the background. It 
is known that low-income individuals have difficulty reorienting their behaviour, despite the 
imposition of additional costs; thus, a serious problem of justice arises (Saint Pol, 2007).12 
This is accentuated by the fact that taxes on food are regressive; that is, they 
disproportionally affect lower-income populations. In fact, since food expenditures consume a 
relatively higher percentage of resources for low-income households than they do for higher-
income households, any increase in the price of food automatically compromises the 
financial position of the former. This being the case, is it morally acceptable to further 
penalize the populations that form the most disadvantaged groups in society? (Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities, 2007)13 The door seems open to the violation of a basic 
egalitarian principle: do not further deteriorate the living conditions of the least well-off 
individuals in society (Rawls, 1997, pp. 106-115).14 
Thirdly, on a practical level, there are two recurring themes. The first involves the 
population’s supposed reticence toward a tax on food (see Jacobson & Kelly, 2000, p. 856; 
Caraher & Cowburn, 2005, p. 1242; AMC, 2007, p. 6; Deglise, 2004; Binette, 2006).15 But is 
this a sound argument? We might, in fact, question just how far the majority’s preferences 
should be respected. The second theme relates to the effects of cross elasticity: that is, the 
transfer of a portion of the demand for the taxed foods to those items that are not taxed but 
are nevertheless harmful to health (Mytton et al., 2007; Marshall, 2000; The Grocery  
                                            
11 The funds collected are not necessarily reinvested in nutritional health. In the United States in 2000, no state or 
city used these funds to promote healthy consumption. 
12 One criterion for indirectly assessing these difficulties, or at least the degree of exposure to unhealthy eating 
and its consequences, is to compare the rates of overweight and obese persons in populations according to 
various criteria (age, socio-professional category, level of education). In a recent study, an INSEE researcher 
found that overweight and obesity levels had risen faster among rural workers and labourers in France 
between 1981 and 2003. Moreover, rates of obese and overweight persons are inversely related to level of 
education.  
13 Taking this into consideration, five American states that tax domestic food for mainly budgetary reasons 
(Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Oklahoma and South Dakota) offer tax credits and rebates to the most disadvantaged 
households, using a variety of methods. 
14 This principle is found, in a different form, in the formulation of Rawls’ theory of justice, which postulates that, 
roughly speaking, inequalities within a society are not just unless they benefit the most disadvantaged. 
Reversing this logic, one can assert that further deterioration of the economic circumstances of the most 
disadvantaged must be avoided. 
15 However, according to a survey carried out by eDiet.com and cited by AMC, 75% of consumers would favour 
this type of measure. Nevertheless, an ethical problem is raised by this survey: eDiet.com sells health-related 
services and healthy food, which would not be subject to a tax on fat. Moreover, such taxes would allow it to 
benefit from a market advantage over competitors that produce “traditional” food. Another survey, cited by Le 
Devoir, reveals that 66% of Quebec’s population would be opposed to a tax on food (Deglise). A study carried 
out in the state of Mississippi revealed that 45% of the population would favour a reduction in the tax on 
domestic food and 40% favour its straight-out abolition (Binette). 
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Manufacturers of America, 2004).16 Strictly speaking, what is involved here is more a limiting 
condition than a critical failing of the concept of applying taxes to demand; given cross 
elasticity, it is necessary to adopt an overall taxation policy that includes all substitutable 
goods that are harmful to health. 
2.2 NEGATIVE INCENTIVES APPLIED TO SUPPLY 
These consist essentially of taxes imposed on manufacturers or distributors. The states of 
Virginia (1977) and Tennessee (1963) and the city of Chicago (1993) are just a few of the 
constituencies that apply such measures. Taxing companies means acknowledging their 
responsibility for food products and their health effects. This is all the more justifiable given 
that these companies profit from the sale of food products, and they determine the nature of 
the goods available on the market. Once the principle of a tax on food has been accepted, 
the choice of target (supply or demand) or of proportionality (who bears which burden and to 
what degree?) can be decided by moral arbitration, i.e., by judging the degree of moral 
responsibility of each of the parties participating in the exchange. This is why the agri-food 
lobby stresses the freedom of consumers, which is essentially an attempt to reduce their own 
share of responsibility. 
The main argument in favour of taxing supply recommends placing the responsibility for 
negative externalities (Begg, Fischer & Dornbusch, 1996, p. 334; Pigou, 2005)17 (i.e., the 
health costs) generated by the commercial exchange of certain food products with those who 
profit from this exchange.18 This situation is identical to that of pollution. In situations where 
the price of a good does not represent the total cost associated with its production, 
companies have a strong interest in producing that good. In the case of unhealthy food, the 
health costs are not fully assumed by the companies that produce it. Thus their production 
costs are lower than the real cost of producing such products. The goal is thus, through the 
imposition of taxes, to get the companies’ costs to approach the real costs and, in this way, 
to make production less attractive. This is, literally, a “disincentive.” Imposing taxes on 
manufacturers has the collateral effect of prompting them to reconsider their range of 
products and offer goods that are less rich in sugar, salt or fat, or, alternatively, to develop 
entirely healthy alternatives. 
                                            
16 Mytton, Gray, Rayner and Rutter maintain that a tax applied solely to fatty foods would lead to the transfer of 
part of this demand toward products rich in salt and thus to an increase in the number of deaths from 
cardiovascular problems in Great Britain. In this sense, they contradict other studies, see Marshall for instance. 
This argument was also used recently by the American agri-food industry in their opposition to an overly hasty 
rejection of trans fats by the Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee; the industry claimed that this would 
increase the levels of saturated fat in foods (The Grocery Manufacturers of America). 
17 An external effect occurs “whenever an individual's production or consumption decision directly affects the 
production or consumption of others, other than through market prices.” (Begg, Fischer & Dornbusch). The 
internalization of negative externalities can be credited to the Nouvelle Économie du Bien-être (new welfare 
economics) initiated by Pigou during the 1920s and 1930s. 
18 An extreme form of this argument includes the supply of quality goods among the social responsibilities of 
corporations. Doing so creates a tendency to use ethics as a criterion when assessing corporate performance 
or even the intrinsic nature of companies. 
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There also exists a secondary fiscal argument. It emphasizes the surplus resources that are 
generated by such taxes, resources that can be used either to supplement the general 
community budget (District of Columbia, Kentucky, Maine, New Jersey, Texas, etc.), or to 
support specific initiatives: funds devoted to Medicaid (Arkansas), prevention of violence and 
the fight against drugs (Washington), etc. (Jacobson & Brownell, 2000, p. 855, Table 1). 
2.3 POSITIVE INCENTIVES TARGETING DEMAND 
The idea here is to promote the adoption of certain behaviours by transferring additional 
resources to consumers, which is achieved by granting tax credits, subsidizing certain 
products, etc. The justifications for this approach resemble those for negative incentives, 
except they are inversed. Instead of trying to discourage behaviours by raising the price of 
certain goods or practices, authorities try to encourage other behaviours by making some 
options more attractive. The mechanism consists of reducing the costs associated with the 
latter. It is based on the premise that individuals choose among several options by making a 
cost/benefit analysis. 
Although the result is the same – for negative and positive incentives – in the sense that 
there is a relative increase in the cost of unhealthy activities and, consequently, a relative 
decrease in the costs associated with healthier activities, in the first instance this is achieved 
by increasing the cost of unhealthy activities (negative incentives), while in the second case 
the cost of healthier activities is reduced. The effect is the same in terms of the price 
differential, except that, in the first scenario, the financial burden is assumed by households. 
The use of positive incentives thus makes it possible to avoid any violation of the basic 
egalitarian principle mentioned above: do not further deteriorate the living conditions of the 
least well-off individuals in society. The use of positive incentives is all the more justifiable 
when the average level of autonomy deemed to prevail within the targeted populations is low. 
Such measures would therefore be more egalitarian than their negative counterparts, since 
the resources used to fund them would not be drawn, indirectly, from disadvantaged 
populations. 
Since the 2007 tax year, the Government of Canada has offered a children’s fitness tax 
credit. A maximum of $500 per year can be claimed for spending on physical activities for 
children under the age of 16 (this is extended to 18 years of age for disabled children). There 
are numerous other examples of the application of positive incentives that target demand. 
The province of Ontario does not collect tax on anti-smoking products. In the United States, 
$1,000 per year can be deducted before taxes for spending on physical activities. These two 
measures inspired the recommendations of the Canadian Medical Association when 
addressing tax incentives. In 2004, the WHO recommended that fiscal policy be reoriented, 
in order to modify the price of goods through three mechanisms (taxation, subsidies, and 
direct pricing), and that physical activity be promoted. 
2.4 POSITIVE INCENTIVES TARGETING SUPPLY 
Using subsidies to modify the costs associated with certain products or components, and 
making it easier to produce or advertise such products, prompts companies to offer them to 
consumers. For example, the Task Force on Trans Fat has recommended adopting a series 
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of measures aimed at prompting manufacturers to reduce the amount of trans fat in their 
food products. These include providing support for research and assistance for new product 
development, as well as facilitating access to the Scientific Research and Experimental 
Development Program offered by the Canada Revenue Agency (Task Force on Trans Fat, 
2005, 2006). 
However, companies producing the blameworthy goods are not the only ones that may be 
targeted by incentives. Incentives may also be offered to companies that produce healthy 
substitute products, in the form of either direct assistance or fiscal measures. For example, 
the French association UFC-Que choisir has proposed a 50% reduction in the cost of 
advertising fruits and vegetables.19 Such measures remove products rich in fat, salt or sugar 
from the market so that real food alternatives can be subsidized or promoted. 
Three main advantages are associated with this type of measure. Firstly, when applied to 
demand they make it possible to go beyond repressive measures and to also promote the 
availability of a diverse range of healthy foods. Assistance offered to companies constitutes 
the counterpart of incentives directed at households. In fact, applying incentives to demand is 
unlikely to produce major effects if supply remains unchanged. Stimulating supply reinforces 
individual autonomy because the range of products available to the individual is widened 
while the cost of certain commodities or activities is lowered and new products become 
available. Secondly, when incentives benefit agri-food companies, the competitiveness of 
products identified with healthy behaviour improves and the sector’s “traditional” actors are 
prompted to re-evaluate the products they offer. Thirdly, such measures provide access to 
preventive policies to actors who had previously been shut out because they were not 
targeted by negative measures (fruit and vegetable producers, organic food products, sports 
facilities, etc.). The promotion of healthy behaviour takes on its true dimensions as a social 
issue; it is not limited to efforts to reduce fat, salt, sugar or tobacco consumption, but rather 
focuses as much on the adoption of new eating habits as on the public’s participation in 
healthy practices (sports). 
 
Complementary measures to accompany incentives may also be contemplated. These might 
include strengthening the public’s ability to make judgements (targeted education programs), 
improving the quality and volume of information available (labelling, information campaigns), 
and reducing the visibility of certain products (candy and potato chips offered at supermarket 
checkout counters). For such measures, the real question needs to be whether or not they 
significantly improve the effectiveness of incentives. 
                                            
19 This is one of the recommendations of the French collective “Obésité: protégeons nos enfants” that was 
launched in September 2007 and which comprises six associations. Lobbying efforts resulted in the 
announcement on February 4, 2008 by the French health minister, Roselyne Bachelot, of the government’s 
intention to implement a series of measures. 
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